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AllhuuKh market models with quantitios :~ti strategic variables h:wc playcd an
important role in economic Uieory, such competition is hardly possible. It is there-
fore necessary to justify such market studies as shortcuts substituting the analysis
of more natural, but also more complex market models. We rely on a two stage-
market decision process, namely a capacity decision stage and a subsequent price
decision stage. Here a capacity constraint means that excess demand has to be
discounted or causes additional costs. Our justification of competition via sales
amounts and the Cournot-solution does not rely on assumptions about rationing
and spill overs and avoids mixed strategy equilibria for price competition.
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1 Introduction
E:ver since, I he piunccriug approac-h of C'ournot (1838) markets with quantities as strategic
variablcs I~avc playcd a dumiuant rolc iu econotnic thcrory. Without special iustitutious
liko ancl.ionc~c~rs quanl,it,y compotit.ion is, howevcrr, hardly possiblc. If such institutions
exist, thcy should, however, be [onnally incorporated.
Market studies, based ou sales amounts as strategic variables, therefore have to be
justified as reduced descriptions of more natural, but possibly also more complex markets.
An innovative attempt in this respect is the study of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) who
justify the duopoly solution of Corn~not (1838) as the result oí a two stage-market on
which scllers (irst choose their sales capacities and then, knowing the vector of sales
capacities; compete via sales prices (Bertrand-competition).
In this note we suggest a similarjustification of the Cournot-solution which, however,
is not restricted to the special case of two sellers. The basic idea is that a capacity con-
straint doe~5 not exclude thaL demand can be served. It only means that excess demand
has to be discounted or causes additional costs. This explains why our justification
of quantity cornpetit.ion is much simpler. Due to our less rigorous and more realistic
dc~finitiuu uf "capacitic~s" dc~inaud is :rlwa}'s sorvc~cl so that wc do uol. havc to impose
assumptions on rationing and spillovers . Thus we avoid the complicated analysis of
n~ixc~cl nt.ratc~gY ~~quilihria fur prici~ cuinpc~tiliun :~ti il. i, Lrur fur Lhc~ uppru:rch uf Kmps
and Schcinkman (1953) and also of Fricdmau (199'l).
It. is intorosting t.hat our approach docs not only justifly sales amounts as strategic
variablcs for homogeneous markets, but also for heterogeneous markets. Homogeneous
markets arc viewed as the limit of heterogeneous markets when the degree of hetero-
geneity approaches zero. For this case we obtain the Cournot-solution for homogeneous
oligopoly rnarkets.
fn Uic ncxt scction wc first describe the simple two stage-model of heterogeneous
oligopoly nrarkets. 'Thereafter, in Section 3, we specify suíficient conditions such that
for all possible vectors of sales capacities no equilibrium price vector can induce excess
supply. In Soctiun 4 and 5 we illustrate for the special class of symmetric markets with2
liuear demand functions, that one approacltes the Cournot-solution for homogeneous
oligopoly ntarkets if this condition holds and if the degree of heterogeneity converges to
zero. 14"e conclude by briefly summarising our results.
2 A two stage-model of heterogeneous oligopolies
Consider a market with sellers i- 1,...,n who each offer just one product for sale
which are close, but imperfect substitutes. The sequential decision process consists of
two stages: First all scllcrs i- l, ..., n determine simultaneously lheir "capacityr x; ~ 0.
Knowing thc vector
~' - (xi,.. ,:c„) E lit
of sales capacities then all sellers i- 1, ... , n simultaneously choose their sales price
p; ? 0. Wc denote by p-(pt, ..., p„ ) the price vector which is chosen on the second
stagc and by x;(p) scller i's demand level for p. We assume that x;(p) is differentiable
in p; wiLlt
8
~p x;(p) G 0 for all i- 1,...,n
whenever both p; and x;(p) are positive, i.e. for the interior oí the positive orthant we
rcquirc a clownwarJ sloping demand curve. We, furthermore, require that there exists a
finitc and positivo uppcr bonnd p; such that x;(p) - 0 for all price vcctors p containing
a componenL p; 1 P;.
In casc~ uf :~ t~usil.ivo c~xcrsa ~Irnnwcl .r,(P) r, t.hix ~,xc~cws dc~in:wd has to hc, xc,rvcd
IaLc~r Ic~ading tu a discumtt or at highcr custs (scc also I~ricdman, 199'l, who ituposes a
similar assutnptiou). 'fhus a given sales constraint i; docs not preclude delivery but
itnplies only a rnorc costly dclivery for the seller. This is the main reason why we assume
profit functious
~;(p,s) - P;tnin {x~(p),T;} f b;p;niax {O,xr(P) - x;} - Cr(x~(P)) - ICt(x~)3
for seller i - 1, ..., n. Nere ê; with 0 C ó; G 1 is the discount factor for serving demand
as excess dcmand.
A discount factor ë; G 1 may, for instance, express that customers, who are served
latcr, are compensated by a discount. Another justification of ó; G 1 would be that such
customers reyuire a special delivery, whose costs are (1 - À;)x;p;, or even simpler that
the proportion 1- Á; of the excess demand x;(p) - x; is finally lost for the market.
C;(r,(p)) are thc production costs for the actual demand x;(p) whereas Iti;(i;) are
thc costs of providing the sales capacity r;. !u order to simplify the notation both cost
functlOns are assumed to be di(ferentiable and to satisfy
C;(x,) 1 c; ~ 0 at x; - i; as well as lí;(x;) 1 0
for all capxcity Ievels r,; ~ 0. Actually we ouly will need that the function C;(x;)
has a right derivative at all possible capacity levels i;. Without further specífication of
appropriate conditions for costs and demand it is simply assumed that a;(p, i) is concave
in p;.
To have an example in mind think of shopkeepers who can order a certain commodity
cithcr in advance at a lower price (a so-called Preorder) or later at the normal but higher
price. I3y offering lower "Preorder-~ prices whole sellers try to shift some of their risks
but also of their profit chances to shopkeepers.
Prcrordcr-pricing can bc described in our framework by a linear rcapacity" cost fune-
tion
K~(~~'~) - c;.~'~
and a piecewise linear cosL function
C;(T;) -
( 0 for 0 G x; C x;
1 (P; f c;)(.r; - á;) for :r; ~ i;
where c;(~ 0) is the lower prcordcr price aud p; f c; with p; 1 0 the higher normal price.
Clearly, C;(~;) has a right derivativc for all possible values i; which is at least p; f E; so
that we can set c; - p; f e;.4
3 A sufficient condition excluding excess demand
in equilibrium
We want to impose a condition for the class of markets described above which exclude
price equilibria
P (z) - (Pi(x),...,Pn(x))
of the second stage-subgames r implying decnand levels
x~(P(r)) 1 xt
for at Icast one, scllcr i- I,...,u. '1'hus althouph our approach docs not rule out that
excess dcmand is scrvcd, thi, actually ncvcr happcns if all sellcrs bchave rationally.
Considcr a second stage-subgame i -(i~,...,i„) and denote by
P - (P-c,P~) - (P~,...,Pn),
whcrc
P-~ - (P~,...,P~-~,P~t1,...,Pn),
a price vcctor for which i; - x;(p') holds. Now
~p ~r(P~,2) - i~ f Ió;P~ - C;(i;)]
cjP~x~(P~) ~ 0
or eyuivalently
r~ ~ I~~~(.c'~) - hrP~] - ~ r,(P~)
vl'.
is the condition that aL r;(p) - r; seller i has no incentive to induce an excess demand
by a lower price than p;. Due to aóx;(p') C 0 and C;(i;) ~ c; ~ 0 this condition can5




where due to c, 1 0 and 0 G p; C oo the upper bound for b; is positive. This proves
Lemma la 7'here exists a non-degenemte interval [0, á;] of discount factors ó; for every
seller i- 1, ..., n such lhat for every conslellation
ó - (br,...,ó„)
nf ,ti.,t~n„ut firrlur.v b, u~ilh 0 ~ h, ~ b, Jur i--- I,..., n nud for all rrtpurily vcrfnrs :r F R~
all pricr rquitiória
P(~) - (Pi(x),...,P,~(T))
of fhe second slage-suLyames satisfy
~'~Í1i(ir)) G i, fnr i- 1, .,n.
Due to Lemma la there exists a generic subset x-r[O,b;)" of discount vectors b-
(br,...,b„) for which exccss clcmand is purely an out of equilibrium-phenomenon. The
capacity decisions á; on the first stage therefore do not rely on expectations of excess
dr-nraud. lu othe~r words: A sellcr i will nover expect a demand Ievel x;(p) which exceeds
thc capacity which hc chooscs on the first stagc.
Of course, even in case of b; - 1 the coudition
~: ? [c;(x:) - ó~P:]' ~ ;x~(P')
that sc~lle~r i dcx~s uot. want. his salrw amount t.o excerd x; can be~ globally satisfied by
assunriug a sharp enough cost iucrease at r;(p') - i; for a further increase of x;. A
sullicir~ntcuurliliun wunhl Lc~, fur iusl.;rnco, Ihal (;(.r,) is al. Ir~:c~t. as hi};h as lhc, pruhibitivc,
pricc P;.G
Lemma lb I-i,r
~;(S;) ? Pr Jor i - 1,...,n
nl! prirr ryuiliGria
Y(r) - (Pi(r)~...~Pn(~))
oJ the sccond stage-suLgames satisJy
.r,(P'(.r)) c r; Jor i- 1,...,n.
Denote by p'(i) an equilibrium price vector in the second stage-subgame defined by
i. In gcneral, there may exist a multiplicity of price equilibria p'(i) for a given capacity
vector r. To derive a unique solution p'(r) for such a case one can apply the theory of
eyuilibrium selection, c.g. the one of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Another possibility is
to impose conditions which guarantee a uniyue price equilibrium p'(i) for all capacity
vectors i. Our special class of markets, introduced in Section 5 below, will illustrate
that thc latter option is feasible.
Without specifying appropriate conditions for costs and demand, we assume for sim-
plic~ity that for all capacity vc~rtors :í thc prire equilibrium p'(i) is unique and that for all
se,llrrs i- l, ... , n a largr~r ,alc~s capacity r, doe~s uot imply a óigher price. Ry inserting
li(r) fur p in thc~ prolit funr liuns rr;(p,.r) unr~ ubtains thc~ so-c~allccl trrnu~ation, i.e. thc
first stage-decision situation as a one stage-gamc which is based on rational expectations
with respcct to the second slage. An cquilibrium point
i~ - (i~,.. .in)
uf Lht, Lruur~al.iuu r an nr~~rr n~ly un
i~ ~ 1~~(P (x~))
for sumc sc~llr~r i- I,..., n siucc duc~ to K;(.r; ) 1 0 for i; ) 0 such a seller i will want to7
choose a smaller sales capacity. Together with Lemmas la and 16 we therefore obtain
Theorem 2 ( ndcr Ihe iuluilivc assumpfion that (arger cupucilies do not induce hiyher
prices, i.e. for every two capacity vectors i' and ï" díffering only in their component
r,' and r;". rc..pcrlinely, .r;' ~ r;" implics p;(r') C p;(~'") eve~h~ suGyame perfect
eqnt(Ibl'IUnt p1'e8('1'7(X'R capacily vccturs ï' wah
ï~ - x~(Pi(ï~)) Íur i- 1,...,n,
i.e. the chosen capacities determine demand, if for i- 1, ... , n the discount factors b;
drres nnl crcrcd Nrc upprr bnuuc( h, rlesrriLrd irt l,rnuna la, nr if ('~(ï;) ~ jr,.
'1'he main message of '1'heorem 1 is that there exists a generic class of heterogerteous
oligopoly markets where competition via sales amounts makes sense. Actually, in the
rango of pricc vectars p, for which .r;(?i(.i')) C i; for somc sellc.r i is itnpossible, the
truncation is nothing else than the oligopoly markets envisaged by Cournot (1838), who,
of course, confine~d himself to the special case o( no hcterogeneity.
Competition via sales amounts cau thus be justified as a shortcut. Instead of solving
a two stage-modcl one simply analyses clirectly its truncation. This justifies, however,
competition via sales amounts in general. There is no need to restrict it to the limiting
case of homogeneous markets. In the next section we study a more specific class of mar-
kets to illustrate our principal justificatiou of competition via sales amounts and to show
that one really obtains the Cournot-oligopoly solution when the degree of heterogeneity
converges to zero.
4 A special class of symmetric markets
1'he special class o( markets asswnes liuear demand [unctions
s~(P)-(Y-~jP;f7-t(P-;-p;) for i-1,...,ra8




of seller i's competitors (see Cuth, 1992, for another application of this demand system).
Since the global upper bound p- a~Q - p; for i- 1, ..., n guarantees x;(p) G 0 for
p; ~ p; and since
a
aP ~;(P) --(Q-f 7-r) G 0 for i- 1,...,n
such demand functions clearly satisíy the previously imposed assumptions. For the cost
functions we assume
K;(i;) - 2x? and C;(a;) - cx;
with d~ 0 and á 1 c~ 0 for i- 1, ..., n which implies
C;(z;) ~ c~ 0 and lí;(x;) ~ 0 for x; 1 0
as previously reyuired. This shows that these symmetric heterogeneousoligopoly markets
define a subclass o[ the markets described in Section 2 and analysed in Section 3. The
assumption á~ c can be described as the coudition that the prohibitive price exceeds
the minimal rnarginal cost level c. It therefore guarantees that no seller will want to
leave thc market.
We rely on the condition, specified by Lemma la above, to rule out price equilibria
p'(i) witlt x;(p'(r)) ~ i; for at Icast one sellcr i- 1,...,n. Assume therefore ó; E[O,D;]
for i- 1, . .., n where b; is sufficient to guarantee non-existence of equilibria p'(i) with
x;(p'(x)) 1 i; for at least some seller i. To determine the truncation, i.e. the first stage-
game based on equilibrium expectations for the second stage, we have to determine the
correspondence p'(i) explicitly.s
Lemma 3 The correspondcnce p'(i) for the special cluss of symmetric oligopoly markets
is given by
Pi (T ) -
(7Q(n - 1) f 1)(a - i~) f ~i~~(a - xi )
(ryi(rl - 1) ~ 1)(Q -~ ry'r ) - ry-i
fori-l,...,n.
Proof: With the hclp of thc n x n-matrix.
A - (i~~~)
with a;; -!i ~- 7-~,a;~ --~ for i~ j and i, j- 1,...,ie thi~ demand system
r~(P) - ~~ -l3P~ f-7-~(P-; - p,) for i- 1,...,n
can be written as
Pi a-ii
A - - :
Pn á - .tin






(7!~(~t - 1) f 1)(Q f ry-' ) - y-i
1
a; -
'-(ryl~(~~ - 1) f 1)(Q f ry-~) -.~-ilo
for all i,l - l.. .., n with i ~,j. Thus
a-rl
P (ï) - A-2 .
rY -2n
or
(7li(n - I ) t I )(cr - ~'i) t ~~~i(o - ~~) rl;(s) - (7~i(21- I) t 1)(d t 7-2 )- y-1
for i - 1,...,n. Q.E.D.
Note that a~ p; (z) c 0 regardless of i. Our asswnption that a larger scales capacity
i; eloes 2wt induce a higher price is therefore always satisfied. Furthermore, this justifies
this assumption as a rather natural one.
Of course, one cannot assumc for all capacity vectors i that sellers will never want
to choose pricc~s on the second stage wiLó r;(p'(i) G i;. l3ut as argued in Section 3 this
cannot be true for a subgame perfect eyuilibrium play. Thus if we restríct ourselves to
deriving all suhgame perfcct eyuilibrium plays we can simply insert p"(i) into the profit
functions what yields
~i(~~)-rli(~')'~i-Ci(ri)-~~i(~i) f01' 2-1,.. ,n
where p~(i) is determinPd by Lemma 3 ahove. With the help of
C.`-ry(~(21-1)tl
and
~ - C(Q t
ry-2) - ,~,-111
these profit [unctions can be written as
c(~ - i~) f~~~~(~ - xi)i; - cá ~~(i) - D
d-Z
2x~
for i- 1, ..., n. From
í) ('o - LCi, -F ~i~;(a - ii)
1)r,~~(r)-- 1)
-c-ds;-0
follows .c; - r~ for all i, j- 1, ... , n aud Lhcrcforc
a(n - 1 ~ C) - cD
~i - n-lf2G}dD




is globally satisfied, i.e. the function n;(i) is concave in i;. This proves
Theorem 9 For all markets in lhe speciul class oJ symmetric oligopoly markets there
exists a unique subgamc perfeet cquilibrium play which prescribes
rr(u f (n - I )Íh) - r~(rr -F (n - I )I)7)Í~
~'i - - n~-I f'?(n-1)llry-fdll(n-~(rr-1)ll1)
and
(7!~(" - I ) f 1 )( r} - r; ) f ~,~;(~ - r~)
pi (s~) - (ryl~(rt - I ) f 1)(l~ f ry-r ) - .y-~
Jor all srllrvs i- I,..., u.12
5 Approaching homogeneity
For the special case of symmetric oligopoly markets whose unique subgame perfect equi-
librium plays have been derived in Section 4 we want to approach the limit situation of
homogeucous products by -y -~ 0 and, furthermore, to compare that limit solution with
the Cournot-solution for homogeneous oligopoly markets.
Let us start by deriving the Cournot-solution for the limit situation of homogeneous
products. Clearly, on a homogeneous market all sellers must choose the same price, i.e.
one has
P; - jr-; for i- 1, ..., n
aud tb~~r~dor~-
:r;(P) - ~r - Ri~
wbere ~i dcuotes tlie same price by all rx sellers. Aggregatiug demand yields the total
dcmand function
.~(P) - ~ x~(P) - na - n,dP
~-i
and thus thc pru(it funcl.iou
na - .i d
~t(x) - ~ x; - cx; - ~x?
n
for i- I,...,n wherc a -(x~,...,r„) is the vector of individual sales amounts and
.C - a~ i. ... ~ :r„ thcir su~n. ('rou~
i) nrr-.~ -r;






one obtains the Cournot-solutiou as
n~ - nar:
x' -nflfnd,0
for i - l, . . . , n.
To compare the C-ournot-solution with our limit result for the extreme situation of
vanishing heterogeneity we compute for i- 1, ..., n
rr(rt -1- (n - I )li7) - r(n } (n - I 113ry)I? arx - n~c
ryin~ r,' - yryr~
n-t- l -~ 'l n- I d3 u f n- 1 3 - n~- l-}- nd ( )!j7 i- I ( ( )I 7) ~
1'his proves
Theorem 5 For thc spcciat rasc oJ syrnmehic oligopoly markets tl:e Cournol-solution
Jor homogencous naarkets can be justifeed as the limit solution oJ heterogeneous markets
wilh a tmn slage-dcri.vion prrx~r.c.c, narncly a first capaeily decision slrsge and a second
pricc dcci.ian stayc, url,en IAc dryrcc oJhrteroycneily convciyes to :cra.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this note is to provide a justification of competition via sales amounts and
thereby thc Cournot-solution for homogeneous oligopoly markets which does not require
specific assrunptious for rationing and spill overs and which avoids the complicated anal-
ysis of price equilibria in mixed strategies as it is true for Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
who, furthermoro, had t.o limit thernselve, to the special casr of just 4wo sellers. The
basic idea is a Iess strict interpretation of what a capacity coustraint implies. líere it has
bc~en assumed that iL is no ahsolute sales restriction but only an upper bound for deliv-
eries which are not to be discoLmted or do not impose additional costs. It is shown that
under rather general assumptions there exists a generic class of markets where the two
stage-markets, cousistiug of a"capacity" dccision stage and a subsequent price decision
stage, iuduce capacity decisions which correspond to Lhc~ onrs derived in models based14
on sales amounts as strategic variables. It is worth mentioning that this justification of
competition via sales amounts is not restricted to homogeneous markets.
For the special of synuuctric and beterogeneous oligopoly markets with linear de-
mand the general statemeut is illustrated by actually computing the subgame perfect
equilibrium pla}'. I'or Ulis special class of markets we also approximate the limit case of
hornogcueity and prove that the limit solution is the Cournot-solution for homogeneous
oligoixrly markets.
Our approach junt.ilics runlpcl.itiun vía ,ales anlornlts as a shortcut whicll avoids thc
xnalysis of nlorc complex nlarket models. 13y Lhis we clo not claim that such market
StU(IIe9 ('all preclict actual nlarkeL bellavior. Ispecially we do not argue Ihat Lhe Cournot-
solutiou for homogcneous markets is a powerful explanatory tooL [n our view, more and
Inorc nlarkcls arc charactcrisnl by a consi(Icrable degree of heteroge~neity which is at
Ieast partly due to special marketing activities of the interacting sellers.
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